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From Liberal Statism to Statist Liberalism: The Transformation of 
Unemployment Policies in Europe 
 
Daniel Clegg, University of Edinburgh 
 
Introduction 
 
Of all the welfare sectors to have come under pressure for reform in the contemporary 
context of fiscal austerity and economic liberalisation, it is in unemployment policy 
that change has been most far-reaching. In some ways, the relationship between 
liberalisation and unemployment policy reform seems straightforward. Even in the 
post-war decades of healthy economic growth, rising general prosperity and relative 
welfare state consensus, cash benefits for the unemployed were a bête noire for 
liberals everywhere, accused of obstructing the functioning of labour markets and of 
undermining the work ethic. Amongst citizen-voters more generally, unemployment 
benefits have long been perceived as the least legitimate form of welfare state 
provision (Coughlin, 1980). It is thus at first glance unsurprising, if not downright 
banal, that a period of widespread liberalisation should have ushered in a wave of 
thoroughgoing reforms to these eternal ‘benefits of doubt’ (cf. Pennings, 1990). 
 
This chapter argues that recent reforms of European unemployment policies 
nonetheless reveal an interesting and often-overlooked dimension of contemporary 
welfare state transformations, namely the way in which much economic liberalisation 
presupposes an increase in directive state activism. Certainly, the medium-term 
ambition of much contemporary unemployment policy reform is to reduce the scope 
for existence outside the market. Furthermore, in many countries public services that 
traditionally provided job-brokerage and other employment-related services are being 
opened up to competition from private, for-profit, providers (cf. Sol and Westerveld, 
2006). But in a manner recalling Polanyi’s seminal account of Poor Law reform in 
19th century England, these liberalising processes rely not on a dismantling but instead 
on a streamlining and a re-aggregation of existing benefit systems, and in many 
respects an increase in public intervention, both in the operation of the unemployment 
policy sector and in shaping the choices and behaviour of (unemployed) citizens. 
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Unemployment policy thus shows particularly clearly the statist dimension of some 
contemporary market liberalisation1, and more broadly reveals how privatising and 
collectivising trends interact in complex ways across the different levels – discourse, 
institutions and outcomes - of welfare development. 
 
Focussed mainly on the institutional level, the principal concern of this chapter will be 
in mapping and explaining the differing degree to which unemployment policies have 
become more market-supporting in selected European countries over the last ten to 
fifteen years. Acknowledging the potential for arrangements at the institutional level 
to apparently contradict the broader thrust of policy development at the level of 
discourses and outcomes is important here for another, more explanatory, reason. As 
will be discussed, the unemployment benefit policies of the post-war ‘golden age’ of 
welfare statism were in many countries actually pursued through institutional 
arrangements in which the capacity of the state was strictly limited. Because 
contemporary market-supporting unemployment policies require enhanced state 
capacity, the degree of ‘liberalism’ in pre-existing policy arrangements and the 
solidity with which this was institutionalised is, I argue, a decisive factor in explaining 
the prospects for and limits on reform in different national contexts. In some 
countries, the principal challenge to making unemployment policies more market 
friendly is thus justifying more, not less, state intervention. 
 
The chapter is organised in four main sections. The first expands on my overarching 
characterisation of current trends in unemployment policy by contrasting, in ideal 
typical terms, the conception and organisation of traditional and contemporary 
unemployment policies respectively. Section two examines the empirical cases of 
Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK), where notwithstanding the oft-remarked 
differences in the orientation of social and labour market policies recent governments 
have deployed the comparatively high leverage that the central state has always 
enjoyed over unemployment benefits to effect a decisive transition to a more market-
supporting unemployment policy. This contrasts with the cases of Belgium, France 
and Germany, examined in section three. In each of these countries – largely, I 
                                                 
1 Authors such as King (1999) and Standing (2001) have already highlighted the illiberal face of 
liberalisation in unemployment policy. For a similar argument applied to public policy more broadly, 
see the collection edited by Levy (2006). 
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suggest, as a result of the institutionalised influence of private actors in 
unemployment insurance policies – reforms have taken a different route. Though 
there have been considerable changes to unemployment policies in each of these 
countries, more wide-ranging and more market-conforming reforms of the kind seen 
in Denmark and the UK would arguably require a far more explicit coordinating role 
for the state. Underlining this point, section four briefly examines the case of the 
Netherlands, where the essential complementarity between étatisation and 
liberalisation in contemporary unemployment policy reform is perhaps clearest. The 
chapter concludes by drawing out some implications of the argument for our 
understanding of contemporary welfare reform. 
 
Liberal statism and statist liberalism 
 
A characterisation of the current wave of unemployment policy reforms as statist 
draws an implicit contrast with what they are today superseding, namely the 
traditional unemployment policies of the ‘golden age’ of welfare state development. 
My contention is that compared to the recipes currently gaining ground, the 
unemployment policies deployed in the vast majority of European countries up to a 
fairly recent period were indeed quite liberal in some important respects. This is not to 
deny that the distributive implications of traditional unemployment policies were 
often bitterly combated by economic liberals and capital interests, for - as with the 
portrayal of current policies as statist - my argument refers more to institutions and 
procedures than to aims or outcomes. Nor is it to say that the state played no role in 
the institutionalisation and operation of these policies; it certainly did, albeit - as we 
will see below - with marked variations cross-nationally. But the conception of 
traditional unemployment policies was nonetheless everywhere premised on a relative 
restriction of the scope for ‘political meddling’ and bureaucratic judgementalism, and 
conversely on a respect for the consistency and transparency of entitlements and for 
the autonomy of the (unemployed) citizen. Such assumptions were furthermore 
institutionalised, in different ways and to differing degrees cross-nationally, in the 
organisation of the unemployment policy sector. 
 
The key institution in the traditional model of unemployment policy was social 
insurance. Though it was only through state intervention that the limits of mutual or 
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private forms of insurance as a response to the problems thrown up by the 
development of industrial society could be overcome (Castel, 1995; De Swaan, 1988), 
social insurance was nonetheless built on the template of these pre-existing 
institutions. Social insurance was in many respects an outgrowth and a generalisation 
of its mutual and commercial cousins, building as much on the contractual ‘patterns of 
access’ found in market relations and in civil society as it did on those habitually 
associated with the classic citizen-state relationship (Ferge, 2000). In the area of 
unemployment policy, social insurance, with its associated language of ‘risk’ and 
‘compensation’, actually represented a liberal bulwark against the more 
‘transcendalist’ policies of socio-economic regulation put forward by many socialists 
and conservatives alike (Walters, 2000: 59). 
 
The institutionally liberal dimension of golden age unemployment insurance 
provisions can be seen in their financing, their regulation and their content2. Though 
they were obligatory and centrally set, unemployment (and other social) insurance 
contributions were traditionally quite differently conceived from regular taxation, and 
the individual rights to transfers they finance perceived as more inviolable than rights 
to access other collectively (tax) financed goods and services. Unemployment 
insurance contributions were often equated with individual savings, and 
unemployment benefits seen as a ‘deferred’ part of an individual’s duly earned salary 
(Palier, 1999). This special status was in many places institutionalised through the 
creation of discrete collection and distribution agencies, clearly separate from the 
national treasury, and not infrequently devolved to private or para-public institutions 
managed by non-state actors, such as trade unions and employers’ associations. These 
same actors were, partly as a consequence, often also heavily involved in decision-
making around unemployment insurance, diminishing the state’s regulatory autonomy 
accordingly. 
 
In contrast to the now-common characterisation of all golden age social policies as 
standardised and homogenising forms of provision, unemployment insurance benefits 
                                                 
2 This triad of financing, regulation and content is intended as a synthesis between the ‘mixed economy 
of welfare’ framework (financing, regulation and provision) used elsewhere in this volume and the four 
institutional variables (mode of access, benefit structure, financing and governance) commonly referred 
to in the cross-national analysis of income maintenance programmes (cf. Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli and 
Palier, 1998).  
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were – like other social insurances – also often distinctly differentiating, if not wholly 
individualised. Most basically, the contributory requirements for access to 
unemployment insurance benefits allowed the regularly employed worker to be 
distinguished from those more peripherally attached to the labour market, and to 
escape, when temporarily out of work, the collective condemnation which had 
traditionally fallen on the jobless as a whole. The introduction of social insurance thus 
allowed ‘social risks’ to be distinguished from ‘social problems’, however crudely 
(Topalov, 1994). Further, in the vast majority of unemployment insurance systems 
benefit levels were expressed as a percentage of individual salaries, ensuring that the 
individual risk resulting from the loss of employment was adequately compensated. 
Finally, the provision of untied cash benefits actually upheld and supported the 
capacity of the unemployed to make autonomous choices, both with respect to 
planning their professional reintegration and more broadly as normal consumer-
citizens. 
 
With respect to the last point, it might be objected that even for those with good 
contributory records unemployment benefits were never wholly unconditional; 
regulations always existed concerning periodic registration at employment offices, or 
obligations to accept work defined as ‘suitable’. If deployed in moderation, such 
regulations are however not antithetic to a liberal conception of insurance; they 
merely correspond to the protections against ‘moral hazard’ that are built into most 
standard forms of private insurance contract. It was with moderation – and many 
today would argue laxity - that such controls on the status and behaviour of benefit 
recipients were in fact deployed in the vast majority of golden age unemployment 
benefit systems. Only in those countries where policy makers were already fixated 
with the impact of unemployment benefits on the operation of the labour market were 
regulatory and bureaucratic controls on the unemployed more intense and punitive, ‘in 
the name of liberalism’ (King 1995; 1999). 
 
The increasing emphasis across the developed world on activation and benefit 
conditionality (e.g. Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004; Dufour et al., 2003; 
Lødemel and Trickey, 2001) is perhaps the most obvious indicator of a more 
widespread shift to paternalistic unemployment policies in the contemporary period. 
Governments everywhere have come to see the liberty traditionally left to benefit 
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recipients to organise their own labour market reintegration as problematic, 
encouraging insufficiently active or strategic job-search and leading to dangers of 
long-term labour market detachment and benefit dependency. In response, the 
emergent unemployment policy paradigm emphasises the need for stricter behavioural 
controls and more directive interventions in the job-search (and eventually the job re-
qualification) process, beyond the simple prevention of moral hazard. Though the 
shift is often characterised discursively as one of rebalancing individual rights with 
individual responsibilities, the new policies are just as much about an increase in 
collective, governmental enforcement and orientation capacities. 
 
Beyond activation per se, it is a completely new conception of unemployment 
protection – and indeed unemployment - that is emerging. This can be seen in the 
challenge to the contribution principle that for so long underpinned the operation of 
unemployment insurance. In a labour market where more transitions and flexible 
employment trajectories are valorised, a contribution record – and more generally an 
individual’s employment history and past status - is no longer considered a fair or 
useful basis for determining the access to and level of social support in 
unemployment, being seen to over-compensate some unemployed individuals at the 
expense of the financial penalisation or even exclusion of others. The emergent trend 
is thus towards the levelling-out of eligibility and entitlements, whether this is 
achieved through an alignment on the situation of the traditionally least protected, on 
that of the traditionally most protected, or something in between. Related both to this 
and to the trend to activation, a contribution history is also no longer seen as a 
meaningful proxy for ‘autonomy’ or ‘proximity to the labour market’, and thus as 
evidence that unemployment is the result of impersonal structural forces rather than 
personal deficiencies. The conventional distinction between the ‘risk’ of 
unemployment and the ‘problem’ of joblessness is collapsing (Walters, 1996). 
Though some gradations of benefit status amongst the jobless population persist, it is 
increasingly individual ‘profiling’ procedures that trigger additional interventions, a 
far cry from the old idea - implicit in the notion of the ‘deferred salary’ - that good 
contributors have some inalienable right to unconditional income support. 
 
The emergent policy paradigm has implications not just for the content of 
unemployment benefit policies, but also for their financing and regulation. There are 
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pressures, firstly, to ease the rigidity of the demarcation between the financial circuits 
of unemployment insurance and regular public taxation and expenditure. 
Unemployment policy is drawn ever closer to the field of fiscal policy, to facilitate 
both the fine-tuning of individual tax incentives and to make the financing of social 
protection more ‘employment friendly’, notably by shifting the financial burden from 
labour costs to general revenues (cf. Palier, 1999). The smooth integration of passive 
and active labour market policies also presupposes the ability to cross-finance 
initiatives that in the past were often funded out of social contributions and general 
taxation respectively. The dissolving barriers between active and passive labour 
market policies also challenge, secondly, an institutional separation between the 
public employment service and the unemployment benefit system. At the delivery 
level the emphasis is now placed on offering ‘single gateways’ to all employment-
related services (Clasen et al., 2001), while at the policy level the need for co-
regulation, as well as co-financing, of these two domains is ever more strongly 
affirmed. More generally, the demise of the distinction between the risk of 
unemployment and the problem of joblessness is undermining the notion that the 
treatment of the former can be in some way self-regulating, insulated from the more 
obviously politico-bureaucratic forms of regulation to which the latter has always 
been subjected. 
 
Traditional unemployment policies are thus under increasing pressure for reform in 
Europe and beyond. But though the broader context for these calls for reform is one of 
economic liberalisation, the thrust of institutional reform is in many ways statist, 
bringing statutory oversight and bureaucratic control back into a policy sector that had 
long operated more or less under its own steam. The ‘more or less’ of this last 
sentence is quite crucial, though, for as suggested in the country studies below it is 
largely by understanding the differing degrees of public influence over traditional 
unemployment policies that we can properly understand the varying ways in which 
the transformation of unemployment policy is actually advancing in the different 
welfare states of Europe. 
 
Statist clean sweep: the British and Danish cases 
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The cases of Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK) are now well known in the 
international literature on unemployment policy reform, often held up as diametrically 
opposed models of contemporary, post-compensatory, unemployment policy (cf. 
Barbier, 2004; Torfing, 1999). Without necessarily contesting this portrayal, it can 
nonetheless be observed that from a more structural perspective reforms in the two 
countries also share a number of common features (Clasen and Clegg, 2006).  
 
A first commonality between the two cases is to have effectively moved (further) 
towards a de-differentiated structure of benefit provision for the unemployed. In 
Britain, this has essentially occurred through the progressive alignment of rights for 
all the unemployed on those conventionally reserved for workers without any 
contributory records, that is to say unemployed recipients of social assistance. 
Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997 enacted the most significant 
reforms in this regard. After the modest earnings-related supplement paid to the 
unemployed with the longest contribution records was scrapped in 1982, reforms in 
1988 tightened the contribution requirements for access to insurance-based 
unemployment benefit (UB). The duration of entitlement of these was then reduced 
from 1 year to 6 months with the introduction of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) in 1996 
and, tellingly, their monetary value aligned with means-tested benefits for the jobless 
(now called ‘income-related JSA’). New Labour governments since 1997 have 
reversed none of these reforms, and the proportion of unemployed receiving 
insurance-based benefits, around 50% in 1980, had fallen as a result to only 16% in 
2001 (DWP, 2003). Insurance-based benefits have been made so exclusive and 
modest that they are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the social protection of the 
jobless in Britain. 
 
In Denmark, unemployment benefit rights have actually long been relatively 
undifferentiated, a result firstly of the relatively open access to the insurance system 
and secondly of the comparatively low benefit ceiling, which limits the extent that 
insurance benefits can vary with earnings. Directly contrary to Britain, this is a system 
where the majority of the unemployed receive insurance benefits and only a very few 
social assistance. Recent reforms have mainly been concerned with safeguarding this 
historic ‘levelling-up’ approach to standardisation in unemployment benefit provision. 
Thus, while some new differentiations in benefit rights were introduced in the 1980s – 
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lower benefit rates for those with partial contribution records, for example – these 
were removed in subsequent reforms. Since the early 1990s, cuts have instead largely 
been general ones, notably the progressive reduction in the maximum duration of 
insurance benefits from 7 to 4 years, irrespective of contribution record, between 1993 
and 1998 (cf. Goul Andersen, 2002). These changes have allowed the Danish 
unemployment insurance system to remain economically viable even with a 
beneficiary rate3 that, at around 80% at the end of the 1990s, is the highest in Europe 
(Samek, 2001: 61).  
 
Another similarity in recent unemployment policies enacted in the two cases is the 
embrace of generalised activation. Of course, there are significant differences in the 
content of activation, notably in the level of investment in training provision, far 
higher in the Danish than British case. We could with some justification contrast the 
‘positive’ activation practiced in Denmark and the ‘negative’ activation practiced in 
the UK (Barbier, 2004, Torfing, 1999). In both countries activation has since the mid-
1990s nonetheless become a core guiding principle in benefit provision for all the 
unemployed, and increasingly also for other inactive groups. 
 
In both countries, finally, activation has also resulted in and been facilitated by 
significant changes to the organisation of the policy sector. In the UK, UB and social 
assistance for the jobless were merged and harmonised with the creation of JSA. After 
the ‘Restart’ initiative launched in 1986 the administrations in charge of employment 
policy (the Employment Service) and benefit policy and administration (the Benefits 
Agency) were also ever more closely coordinated, culminating in their merger to 
create a ‘Working Age Agency’. At the delivery level, finally, benefit and job search 
services are increasingly brought together in the so-called Jobcentre Plus, which is 
now the pivot of provision for all the registered unemployed as it is for other working 
age benefit claimants. This has institutionalised a shift away from the historic focus 
on unemployment and towards an emphasis on ‘worklessness’ in UK labour market 
policy (Clasen, 2004). 
 
                                                 
3 Proportion of unemployed individuals receiving unemployment benefits. 
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To date, institutional changes in Danish unemployment policy have been less radical. 
The pre-existing pillars of labour market policy – the trade union-run unemployment 
insurance system, the local authority-run social assistance, and the state-run public 
employment service – retain distinct institutional identities, though their activities and 
interventions have since the mid-1990s increasingly been channelled through and co-
ordinated by tripartite labour market authorities which operate at the regional level 
(Ploug, 2004). From January 2007, though, the desire to provide a common gateway 
to all services for all of the unemployed has led to the creation of 90 new ‘Jobcentres’, 
fairly explicitly modelled on the integrated British system. In 10 pilot centres the 
administrative responsibility for the unemployed rests entirely with the local 
authorities. If this model is generalised, it will represent a considerable enhancement 
of the state’s role in Danish labour market policy, essentially to the detriment of the 
trade union funds. 
 
In sum, in Denmark and the UK major changes in the conception and the 
institutionalisation of unemployment policy have taken place in recent years. More or 
less in parallel, these reforms have encouraged or consolidated a (more or less 
generous) standardised approach to unemployment benefit rights, have introduced 
broadly universal activation, and shaken up the organisation of the policy sector to 
encourage coordination and single points of access to the system for all claimants; all 
characteristic reforms in the transition to an unemployment policy that is both more 
institutionally statist and explicitly market-supporting. 
 
It is arguable that the relative ease with which British and Danish governments have 
been able to effect this transformation – a veritable ‘clean sweep’ across a number of 
interlocking policy dimensions - owes much to the fact that in both countries the state 
always retained considerable leverage over unemployment benefit policy, even when 
it operated on a more classic insurance basis. The broader context in which British 
unemployment policy operated was a welfare system characterised by Harris (1992: 
116) as “one of the most uniform, centralised and bureaucratic and ‘public’ … in 
Europe, and indeed the modern world”. Though unemployment insurance benefits 
were financed from a national insurance fund, this fund always had limited 
independence from the Treasury. Furthermore, following Beveridge’s principle of 
integrated administration, unemployment benefit was always controlled by a central 
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government agency without social partner or other civil society involvement. Though 
the contribution principle may have been discursively important in post-war British 
unemployment policy, it was therefore never buffered by supportive institutional 
mechanisms, and was always vulnerable to being revoked by the state when 
conditions seemed to require this (Clasen, 2001). 
 
The institutional set-up of the Danish unemployment policy sector was traditionally 
less unambiguously state-dominated than the British, and this no doubt helps to 
explain why institutional change has in recent years advanced somewhat less rapidly 
there than in the UK. Specifically, the important role accorded to trade unions in the 
management of the voluntary ‘Ghent system’ of unemployment insurance has 
complicated coordination efforts, the unions being highly resistant to any reforms that 
would undermine the perceived link between union membership and benefit rights 
that acts as a powerful recruiting agent for them (Lind, 2004). For a number of 
reasons this has not diverted the direction of reform too substantially, however. 
Firstly, good relationships between the union movement and the social democratic 
party meant that the former could be encouraged to cooperate with many 
governmental reforms during the 1990s, when the social democrats were in office. 
More importantly, unemployment benefits in Denmark are around 80% tax financed 
and this, along with the broader context of a universalist welfare state tradition, gives 
the Danish state considerable legitimacy to steer unemployment policy reforms 
(Ploug, 2004). This emboldens governments less sympathetic to labour interests to 
advance reform agendas that the unions oppose, and diminishes the ability of the latter 
to mobilise support against such changes. 
 
Embracing the more statist new unemployment policy paradigm has in short been 
relatively uncomplicated in Denmark and the UK, because in each of these countries 
state intervention was widely accepted and provided for in traditional unemployment 
benefit policy. The cases of Belgium, France and Germany remind us that this was not 
always the case, and show that where the autonomy of unemployment insurance from 
the state was more strongly institutionalised the transition to new unemployment 
policy paradigm has proved considerably more complicated. 
 
Subsidiarity versus the market: the Belgian, French and German cases 
 12 
 
Belgium, France and Germany are ‘Bismarckian’ or ‘conservative’ welfare states, and 
a guiding principle of such systems is subsidiarity (Van Kersbergen, 1995). In the 
realm of social insurance, the practical implication of the subsidiarity principle has 
been the retention of significant managerial and sometimes also policy responsibilities 
by private corporate actors, notably the trade unions and/or employers associations. 
This can be seen in the Belgian, French and German unemployment insurance 
systems, albeit in different ways (cf. Clegg, 2007). In Belgium, unemployment 
benefits are formally a Parliamentary prerogative, but they are administered largely by 
the trade unions in a compulsory variant of the Ghent system found in Denmark. In 
France trade unions and employers jointly regulate unemployment insurance through 
periodically renegotiated collective agreements, without there being any formal 
decision-making role for the state beyond validating (or otherwise) agreements 
reached by the social partners. In Germany, finally, unemployment benefits are a 
competence of the federal government, but managed through a tripartite institution in 
which the unions, employers and public authorities (Federal government, Länder and 
municipalities) are all represented. In each of these national cases the unwillingness or 
inability of successive governments to override the interests of private actors thus 
institutionalised in the governance of unemployment insurance has considerably 
complicated attempts to move resolutely towards a more market-conforming 
unemployment policy. 
 
The social partners’ influence over unemployment insurance legislation has, firstly, 
pushed against the adoption of reforms that fully decouple benefit rights from 
individual contributory records. As core workers with long work histories tend to be 
both unions’ main constituency and the prime targets of employers’ strategies to shed 
high cost-low productivity workers, both sides of industry have an interest in gearing 
social protection systems first and foremost to the needs of labour market ‘insiders’ 
(cf. Ebbinghaus, 2006). Furthermore, in a context where the legitimacy of the social 
partners’ managerial role in social protection – which they value highly - derives 
essentially from the contributory nature of benefits, these actors have an obvious 
interest in reaffirming this, even if the price is a narrower definition of the risk that 
contributory benefits can cover. 
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In their role as joint decision makers for the unemployment insurance system, the 
French social partners have thus in the main coped with a context of consistently high 
unemployment since the early 1980s by linking benefit rights more, not less, closely 
to contributions (cf. Daniel, 2001). ‘Bad risks’ were transferred to a tax-financed 
‘solidarity’ system separate from unemployment insurance in reforms adopted in the 
early 1980s, and the dualism of the unemployment benefit system has since been 
reaffirmed and even reinforced. In Germany, reforms in the 1980s and 1990s also 
tended to reduce the generosity of unemployment protection mainly for job starters 
and those with repeated spells of unemployment while simultaneously extending 
entitlement for core workers. Though the Hartz IV reform of 2004 reversed the latter 
trend by limiting insurance-based support to a maximum of 12 months, it has if 
anything widened the rights gap between the (now smaller) core of claimants in 
receipt of wage-based support and a (growing) periphery of those who must rely on 
means-tested assistance (Clasen, 2005). While Hartz IV certainly represented a quite 
radical change to German unemployment protection (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 
2007), the calibration – if not the extent - of reform had closer parallels with the 
French case (cf. Eichorst, 2007) than with the more homogenising logic of British and 
Danish unemployment benefit reforms. 
 
Unemployment benefit reform has followed a somewhat different path in Belgium. 
The system has certainly been instrumentalised in ‘labour shedding’ policies, thanks 
to the vast and to date difficult-to-reverse expansion of early retirement pensions 
financed out of unemployment insurance revenues (Kuipers, 2006). But normal 
benefits have otherwise become much less differentiated by contribution and 
employment history, as a result of maximum benefits being allowed to stagnate 
relative to minimum benefits and of benefit rates increasingly being adjusted to 
assumed household need (Marx, 2007). The Belgian trade unions have, it seems, 
implicitly accepted sacrificing the wage-protection function of unemployment 
insurance benefits to safeguard the traditional absence of any limits on the duration of 
payments. This unique historical feature of the Belgian system prevents the vast 
majority of the unemployed from falling into social assistance, but in so doing also 
safeguards the income that the union-run benefit payment agencies can claim from the 
federal government for each unemployed individual receiving insurance benefits from 
them. In other words, though benefit reforms in Belgium seem more in line with the 
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new unemployment policy paradigm than those in France or Germany, this is less 
because Belgian governments have proved more adept at overriding the interests of 
institutionalised actors than because the actors in place and their interests differ 
somewhat. 
 
The state’s limited capacity for regulatory intervention has had more similar policy 
effects in the three countries with respect to the closely related areas of activation and 
the organisational reform of the unemployment policy sector. Regarding the former, 
the unions’ desire to prevent downward pressure on wages coupled with employers’ 
reticence about destabilising existing complementarities between benefit regulations 
and collective bargaining arrangements has generally tended to act as a bulwark 
against the development of more negative activation policies. Positive forms of 
activation, such as greater short-term investment in training in search of (possible) 
longer-term savings, have for their part come up against the problem of the jealously 
guarded but always precarious fiscal autonomy of self-regulating unemployment 
insurance funds. More integrated financing and regulation of different labour market 
policies, meanwhile, has proved very difficult to reconcile with the institutionalised 
division of responsibilities between the state and private social actors. Indeed, to the 
extent that benefit reform has often involved drawing clearer distinctions between 
contributory (contribution-financed) and non-contributory (tax-financed) rights (see 
above), there are as many trends to further financial and managerial fragmentation as 
there are to integration (Clegg, 2007). 
 
In France and Belgium governmental activation initiatives have accordingly largely 
concentrated on the assistance margins of the unemployment protection system, where 
the social partners have no institutionalised influence, and left the insurance core, 
where they do, relatively untouched. This is true in Belgium despite the fact that, due 
to the unlimited duration of unemployment benefits, most of the unemployed have 
been kept out of social assistance. The minimum income scheme (formerly Minimex, 
now Revenu d’Integration Sociale) has nonetheless been the site of most activation 
activity to date, and where explicit efforts to systematically link employment creation 
measures to benefit delivery have been most successful (Gilson and Glorieux, 2005). 
In France, too, the development of activation has followed a clearly selective path, 
with governmental employment measures being de facto targeted on groups excluded 
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from unemployment insurance coverage (cf. Daniel and Tuchszirer, 1999), and 
contractual approaches to benefit policy being pioneered in schemes such as the 
Revenu Minimum d’Insertion social assistance. In both countries the activation logic 
has slowly ‘worked up’ to unemployment insurance since around the turn of the new 
millennium, but creating a coherent policy has to date been hampered by the difficulty 
of coordination problems between the unemployment insurance system and the state. 
The German situation is for its part a little different, given that the Federal Labour 
Office (BA) was always responsible for the financing of active as well as passive 
measures. The double effect of this situation was that measures were targeted on the 
insured unemployed, and tended to be strongly pro-cyclical (cf. Schmid et al., 1992). 
The recent Hartz reforms carry the promise of targeting measures on the basis of 
individual rather than budgetary considerations, but also the risk – given the 
substantial gulf in perceptions of the appropriate treatment of the new ‘unemployment 
benefit I’ and ‘unemployment benefit II’ claimants that the legislation manifests – of 
exacerbating rather than undermining status-based distinctions in the quality of social 
rights (Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2005: 104). 
 
In both France and Belgium, the need for a more integrated approach to 
unemployment benefit and placement/employment policy has been recognised for a 
long time, but has yet to give rise to more than weak ‘cooperation agreements’ 
between the different institutional actors. This owes much to the perceived need not to 
encroach on the autonomy of the unemployment insurance institutions managed by 
the social partners (France) or the unions (Belgium), coupled with the unwillingness 
of governments to give these actors full control over the public employment service 
(De Lathouwer, 2004; Maire, 2005). That these actors may not operate fully in the 
public interest is thus recognised, but not sufficiently to justify their expulsion from 
their historic unemployment policy roles4. In Germany the situation is again 
somewhat different, given that the BA has long cumulated both placement and 
payment functions in unemployment policy. Recent reforms have however 
restructured the BA partly in an attempt to reduce the influence of the social partners, 
with at present uncertain success (Streeck and Trampusch, 2005: 186). 
                                                 
4 The new French government has however recently unveiled a proposal for the ‘fusion’ of the public 
employment service and the unemployment insurance system. At the time of writing (October 2007), 
the extent to which this reform will undermine the autonomy of the social partners in unemployment 
insurance policy is unclear. 
 16 
 
Differences between the cases notwithstanding, the important general point is that in 
all the participation of private actors in the regulation of unemployment insurance has 
acted as a brake on the smooth transition to a more market-supporting unemployment 
policy. By participating in its governance, private actors have developed a stake in 
classical insurance-based unemployment policy, and have been able to use their 
institutional position to defend it. This has not ruled market-conforming reforms out 
altogether, but ensured that they can develop only incrementally, in the gradually 
expanding interstices of pre-existing but increasingly stretched institutional 
arrangements (Clegg, 2007). A more coherent policy of recommodification, however, 
would seem to require the state assuming a far more central regulatory and steering 
role in unemployment protection than the subsidiarity principle has traditionally 
sanctioned. 
 
A great transformation: the Dutch case 
 
It is in this context that the Dutch case is particularly enlightening. On the one hand, 
the Netherlands is another welfare state that has conventionally been characterised as 
Bismarckian, at least with respect to the sectors like unemployment and disability that 
are covered by ‘workers insurances’ (cf. Kuipers, 2006). In the Netherlands, like in its 
three neighbours, the effective regulation of unemployment policy was accordingly 
long devolved in large part to the social partners, and the tradition of subsidiarity was 
very strong. And yet the Netherlands is, like Denmark and the UK, one of the 
European countries most often presented as having undergone a truly radical 
transformation in socio-economic policy generally, and unemployment policy 
specifically (e.g. Green-Pedersen et al., 2001). Understanding how this was possible 
should tell us something more about the conditions for fundamental liberalising 
reforms in contemporary unemployment policy. 
 
The Dutch reform trajectory in unemployment policy shows evidence of a marked 
change of direction in the early to mid 1990s (Clegg, 2007). Up to that point reform 
had followed a trajectory in which the institutionalised influence of the social partners 
was palpable. With respect to benefit reforms, this was clearest in the 1987 New 
Unemployment Insurance Act (NWW). Though the government had previously 
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announced its intention to introduce a major ‘system reform’, NWW ultimately 
strongly reaffirmed the insurance character of unemployment benefits, notably by 
reducing the role of tax finance in unemployment insurance benefits and by linking 
benefit entitlement much more closely to employment record and particularly age. 
Following from and in part determining this, the reform also cemented the role of the 
social partners in the governance of the system (Boekraad 1998: 735). Subsequent 
reforms, however, have been notably more nuanced in their distributive logic. With 
the ‘Purple’ Lib-Lab coalition led by Wim Kok now in power, a 1995 reform did 
further tighten contributory eligibility requirements, but also extended rights to 
prolonged benefits for younger claimants and introduced a new short-time, flat-rate 
benefit within the insurance system for those who did not meet the new eligibility 
requirements for full benefit. A 2005 reform made unemployment benefit rights less 
dependent on the so-called ‘nominal’ work record – in fact an indirect measure of age 
– and thereby corrected some of the age-bias of the system. 
 
Again initially following a trajectory similar to Belgium, France and Germany, 
activation approaches in Dutch benefit policy were also developed largely at the 
assistance margins of the unemployment protection system. Faced with the growing 
number of unemployed people receiving social assistance, the late 1980s saw the 
introduction of ‘reorientation interviews’ for the long term unemployed, organised 
around cooperation agreements between local social services departments and the 
placement offices of the national employment service (ibid: 756). The so-called 
‘stimulating function’ of benefit administration was further reinforced by a new law 
on social assistance in 1989, and finally completed by the New National Assistance 
Act of 1996 which, in addition to simplifying and individualising benefit norms, 
imposed an explicitly contractual approach on assistance claimants directly inspired 
by the French RMI (Westerveld and Faber, 2005: 170). Finally, the Jobseekers 
Employment Act of 1997 created communal employment funds out of pre-existing 
special employment measures for the young and long-term unemployed, facilitating 
the more seamless and explicit linkage of the latter with the communally administered 
social assistance system. 
 
If these activation initiatives were initially concentrated essentially on the assistance 
margins of the unemployment system, it was above all because the social partners 
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used their governance role to prevent their developing at the system’s insurance core. 
This was highlighted very explicitly by the report of a Parliamentary enquiry, under 
the chairmanship of the socialist Flip Buurmeijer, in 1993. The Buurmeijer 
Commission showed that, for all talk of the need for activation or ‘volume policy’ 
since the mid- to late-1980s, the reality of the development of the workers insurances 
had in fact been an ‘inverted volume policy’. Regarding unemployment insurance, the 
commission highlighted that the bipartite industrial boards that managed the benefit 
had few contacts with the public employment service, and had done little to try to 
develop these. Though it emphasised the responsibility of legislation – and thus of 
state actors, the government and Parliament – for the passivity of the insurance 
system, it underlined that this was largely derivative of the considerable role in the 
shaping of social security policy that was exerted by the social partners, and the desire 
of successive governments not to encroach on the latters’ terrain. While the 
responsible Ministers had occasionally put out signals arguing the need for a more 
activating approach, the Commission demonstrated that these had gone essentially 
unheard by the industrial boards (cf. Boekraad, 1998: 743-754).  
 
The Commission would possibly never have been asked to report on the workers 
insurances managed by the social partners had it not been for the swelling caseload of 
disability benefit recipients in the Netherlands, which pointed more clearly than 
elsewhere to dysfunctions in their operation. The parallel existence of a state-managed 
system of national insurances perhaps also made social partner involvement in social 
security regulation and administration appear less inevitable in the Netherlands than in 
other national contexts. For whatever reason, the 1990s saw a serious attack on the 
principle of subsidiarity in social policy affairs, of which the Buurmeijer 
Commissions report was just the first act. In the years following its publication, there 
were a succession of new ‘laws on the organisation of social insurances’, in 1995, 
1997 and 2000. The organisational reform path followed was complicated and in 
some ways confused (cf. Hemerijck, 2003: 253-255; Wierink, 2000), but in general 
demonstrated a growing willingness to no longer merely adapt unemployment 
insurance policy according to the institutionalised logic, but instead to challenge 
institutional logics that do not fit with political and policy objectives. This has opened 
the way to a major restructuring of the work-welfare interface, and consequentially to 
a general activation approach that goes far beyond with what was previously possible. 
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When in 1999 the social partners responded very critically to the government’s 
proposal to try and further improve co-operations between the public Centres for 
Work and Income (CWI) and the UVI - which they clearly saw as a menace to their 
managerial autonomy in social security – the government did indeed withdraw its 
policy proposal. But instead of then falling into line with the social partners’ preferred 
option of a complete privatisation of social security management, the government’s 
new project in November 1999 opted “for an integral return to public competence in 
the administration of benefits and a considerable reduction in the role of the social 
partners” (Wierink, 2000: 33). Though the government conceded the social partners a 
policy-advisory role in a new Council for Work and Income, it otherwise rode out 
their protests at being evicted from a sector that they esteemed to be their ‘property’.. 
The new organisational framework, with the public CWI at the centre as the point of 
access to all work and welfare services, was institutionalised in the 2001 law on 
‘implementation structures for work and income’ (SUWI), which has effectively 
generalised the programmatic integration of employment policy and social security, 
and introduced the principle of obligatory profiling interviews for all of the 
unemployed (Hemerijck, 2003: 260). 
 
It is probably fair to say that the Dutch welfare state reforms, including in the area of 
unemployment policy, remain open to a certain amount of misrepresentation in 
international debates. The theme of the consensual ‘polder model’ of revived 
corporatism and negotiated reform, with the 1982 Wassenaar agreement on wages and 
working hours as its epitome, came to dominate international debates, even though the 
works most often cited as supporting evidence (e.g. Visser and Hemerijck, 1997) tell 
at least a rather more complicated story across the Dutch political economy as a 
whole. Some have actually suggested that with respect to the reforms undertaken by 
the Kok governments in the mid-1990s, the emphasis on revived private interest 
government is just plain wrong; “foreign observers celebrated the very characteristics 
of the Dutch system that the purple coalition had consigned to the dustbin of history” 
(Hendriks, 2001: 37). In unemployment policy, a good case can be made that the 
institutional reforms that unfolded in the years following the Burmeijer report were 
more a case of the state intervening decisively to make the fateful changes necessary 
for the market to develop, rather as Polanyi analysed in his account of ‘the great 
 20 
transformation’ in 19th century England. In this respect the Dutch case also confirms 
better than perhaps any other the principal arguments of this chapter as a whole; 
current liberalising reforms in unemployment policy require more not less state 
activism, and the ability to effectively deploy state power is one of the key predictors 
of whether liberalisation will be fully and unequivocally embraced. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Uncomplicated narratives of welfare state transformation – such as the notion of a 
transition from welfare statism to liberalism – have unquestionable rhetorical appeal 
both for those who welcome contemporary changes and for those who deplore them. 
As this chapter has illustrated with reference to unemployment policies, however, 
such narratives often rely on a misremembering of the past and a misrepresentation of 
present trends. Close inspection reveals that in unemployment policy the heyday of 
welfare statism was in fact a time when the state often remained institutionally in the 
shadows, operating through the invisible hand of largely self-regulating social 
insurance arrangements. Inversely, though the public sector’s share in the economy 
may today be shrinking, its retreat is in unemployment policy being marshalled and 
facilitated by far more explicit and obvious state interventionism than in the past. In 
unemployment policy the result is a certain dissonance in the logics of change at the 
level of institutions, on the one hand, and at the level of discourses and outcomes, on 
the other. 
 
Recognition of this more complex reality, both historical and contemporary, has 
implications for how we explain the dynamics of ongoing welfare state 
transformations. For example, when Pierson (1994) argued that state capacity was 
“hardly relevant” to the retrenchment dynamics of benefit programmes, he arguably 
had both an overly restrictive understanding of retrenchment and a limited view of 
state capacity. Many of the reforms promoted in the new unemployment policy 
paradigm can fairly easily be equated to retrenchment, and for many of them state 
capacity qua enforcement power is, as shown above, clearly relevant. Furthermore, 
state capacity should also be understood to mean rather more than simple bureaucratic 
probity or ‘bricks and mortar’ issues, and expanded to include the institutional 
arrangements underpinning specific policy areas that can determine the legitimacy of 
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the state to intervene in and direct reform at all. As described above, variations in such 
capacities have been crucial in explaining the unemployment policy reform paths 
taken in different European countries in recent years. 
 
Understanding the dissonance of current trends across different levels can also help us 
to more fully understand the challenges that contemporary welfare state reformers 
face. For the reasons described above, unemployment policy reform often requires the 
state doing more so that it can do less, wrestling responsibilities from private actors so 
that it can impose more responsibility on private individuals. Though this course of 
action makes perfect sense intellectually, it is difficult to package in a political world 
where uncomplicated narratives understandably hold sway. Between simple reform 
discourses and the complex nature of the welfare state transformations underway there 
is a gulf that can be exploited by opponents of change and where incomprehension 
and resentment can develop as reforms are forced through. Recognising the 
complexity of contemporary welfare state transformations also helps us, therefore, tell 
richer stories about why these transformations are often difficult and usually 
politically risky.  
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